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Abstract 
 
Once upon a time there was a classical financial world in which all the Libors were 
equal. Standard textbooks taught that simple relations held, such that, for example, a 6 
months Libor Deposit was replicable with a 3 months Libor Deposits plus a 3x6 months 
Forward Rate Agreement (FRA), and that Libor was a good proxy of the risk free rate 
required as basic building block of no-arbitrage pricing theory. 
Nowadays, in the modern financial world after the credit crunch, some Libors are 
more equal than others, depending on their rate tenor, and classical formulas are history. 
Banks are not anymore “too big to fail”, Libors are fixed by panels of risky banks, and 
they are risky rates themselves.  
These simple empirical facts carry very important consequences in derivative’s 
trading and risk management, such as, for example, basis risk, collateralization and 
regulatory pressure in favour of Central Counterparties. Something that should be 
carefully considered by anyone managing even a single plain vanilla Swap.  
In this qualitative note we review the problem trying to shed some light on this 
modern animal farm, recurring to an analogy with quantum physics, the Zeeman effect. 
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1. The Zeeman effect in physics 
Once upon a time in Leiden, in summer 
1896, an unknown 31 years old Dutch 
physicist, Pieter Zeeman (see Figure 1 and 
ref. [1]), disobeyed his director and used 
the university laboratory equipment to 
study the effect of magnetic fields on light 
sources, such as common salt in a flame. 
He was punished for his indiscipline, but 
just six years later he was rewarded, jointly 
with Hendrik Lorentz, with the 1902 Nobel 
Prize in Physics for the discovery of what is 
universally known as the Zeeman effect.  
 
What is it ? Atoms and molecules absorb 
and emit light at discrete frequencies, called 
spectral lines, which are unique and distinctive characteristic of 
the chemical composition of that atom or molecule. Common salt, 
for instance, contains Sodium which is characterized by two 
distinct yellow spectral lines, conventionally called D1 and D2, at 
589.00 nm and 589.59 nm, respectively (see Figure 2, upper 
half 2 ), that anyone can observe in sodium lamps, or just 
throwing a pitch of salt on a flame. If an atom or a  molecule is 
exposed to a static magnetic field, its spectral lines are observed 
to split into groups, called Zeeman multiplets (Figure 2, lower 
half). Spectroscopic data of atoms and molecules were among 
the most comprehensive and accurate experimental observations 
available in Zeeman’s times, thanks to the relative simplicity of 
the required technology. 
Figure 1: Pieter Zeeman (left) and  
Hendrik A. Lorentz (right). 
Figure 2: original 
Zeeman's picture of the 
Zeeman effect in Sodium. 
 
Why? A few years after the discovery of Zeeman’s effect, physicists discovered that 
atomic and molecular electrons occupy quantized states, each characterized by a unique 
distinctive set of quantum numbers and by a discrete energy. Spectral lines of light 
emission and absorption correspond to electronic transitions between different discrete 
energy states, thus occurring at discrete wavelengths. When such a quantum system 
displays certain mathematical symmetry properties (e.g. rotational invariance), some 
distinct electronic states with different quantum numbers may have the same energy, a 
situation called quantum degeneracy. Hence, the corresponding spectral lines have the 
same wavelength, and are experimentally observed as single lines. The external 
magnetic field, imposing a preferred direction, breaks the symmetry of the electronic 
states, because of the different interaction with atomic electrons characterised by 
different quantum numbers, thus breaking the quantum degeneracy and splitting the 
states’ energy up and down. The corresponding spectral lines split as well, and are 
experimentally observed as multiple lines. See Appendix A and ref. [2] for more details.  
 
 
2. The Zeeman effect in finance 
Both Zeeman and Lorentz would be, probably, quite surprised to know that in another 
summer, 111 years later, a similar effect has been observed in finance. In fact, at the 
beginning of the credit crunch crisis in August 2007, significant splits suddenly appeared 
between Libor rates with different tenors quoted on the market. 
 
What is it ? In Figure 1 we show the historical series of the market fixings of two 
interest rates, Euribor and Eonia, over a three-months (3M) period. The Euribor 3M quote 
is the interest rate associated with a Deposit starting at spot date (today + 2 business 
                                                 
2 1 nm (nanometer) = 10-9 m (meters). 
days) and maturing three months later (see eq. (29) and Figure 5 in Appendix B). The 
Eonia 3M quote is the swap rate of an Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) with the same start 
and maturity dates, a fixed leg versus an Eonia indexed leg daily compounded over three 
months, both with a single final payment (see eq. (31) and Figure 6 in Appendix B). The 
difference between these two rates is called Euribor-Eonia 3M basis. We observe in 
Figure 1 that the two rates were essentially coincident until August 2007, when they 
suddenly diverged, reaching a peak of 200 basis points at the Lehman default on 
September 2008. This is the reason why August 2007 is conventionally indicated as the 
beginning of the credit crunch crisis, at least in the interest rate market. The rate 
correlation is usually very highly positive, but it breaks down, even below zero, in the 
most turbulent periods. 
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Figure 1: divergence between Euribor 3 months and OIS 3 months rates,  
and their correlation (1 year window, right scale). 
 
Another example is reported in Figure 2, where we compare the term structures (from 
1Y to 30Y maturity) of the Basis Swaps with all the possible combinations of the most 
common Euribor tenors (1d or over night, 1M, 3M, 6M, 12M) quoted on the market as of 
30 June 2011 (see eq. (32) and Figure 7 in Appendix B).  
Overall, a common pattern is observable: the larger the tenor difference, the larger 
the basis spread. For instance, looking at the Eonia series in Figure 2 (solid lines), we 
observe that the basis spread, for each maturity, increases with increasing Euribor tenor. 
Also these basis spreads were close to zero before the credit crunch in August 2007. 
Similar patterns are observed for other Libor derivatives and currencies. We have called 
this effect “market segmentation” [16]. Pushing the analogy with physics, we may refer 
to these empirical observations as “Libor spectroscopy”. 
 
Why ? Libor, Euribor and Eonia rates are associated with Deposit contracts, unsecured 
loans with different maturities (called tenors) used by primary banks to borrow funds on 
the interbank money market in different currencies (see Appendix B). Before the credit 
crunch, primary banks were considered, for a variety of reasons, to carry a negligible 
default and liquidity risk, as reflected, for example, in their small Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) spreads3, able to raise infinite liquidity on the market. This is called the classical 
“too big to fail” paradigm. 
                                                 
3 Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are Swaps constituted by a protection leg paying the receiver upon default of a 
given reference entity (e.g. a corporate, a bank or a sovereign), versus a floating Libor leg plus a spread (called 
CDS spread). The larger the default probability of the reference entity, the larger the equilibrium CDS spread. 
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Figure 2: EUR Basis Swap term structures as of 30 June 2011.  
Solid lines: Eonia-Euribor Basis Swaps spreads. Dashed lines: Euribor-Euribor Basis Swaps spread. 
 
As a consequence, Libor/Euribor were seen as good market proxies for risk free rates, 
and used as the basic building block of no-arbitrage pricing theory, as described in pre-
crisis textbooks on interest rate modelling (see e.g. [21], [22]). Following these 
assumptions, one easily obtained that all streams of floating Libor payments with equal 
maturity and different rate tenors, as those shown in Figure 3, had equivalent values and 
could be replicated one with each others.  
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Figure 3: picture of floating Swap legs with equal maturities ( ) and 
different Libor tenors (12M, 6M, 3M, 1M, 1d from top to bottom). 
 
 
In mathematical terms, using notation and eq. (33) in Appendix B, one obtained the 
equalities given in the following eq. (1).  
 
  (1) 
 
As a consequence, the corresponding Basis Swaps, being constructed by two floating 
Libor legs with different tenors, displayed negligible basis spreads. Within this context, 
we call this effect Libor tenor symmetry or replication invariance. 
The credit crunch crisis has begun precisely with the explosion of the credit and 
liquidity risk of primary banks, even those included in the Libor panels. The assumption 
of “too big to fail” has been definitely abandoned after the Lehman default. Thus, 
nowadays, after the crunch, banks are risky, interbank unsecured Deposits are risky as 
well, and the market value of this risk is embedded into Libor quotes. The longer the 
maturity of the Deposit contract (the Libor tenor), the higher the credit and liquidity risk 
embedded in the associated Libor rate. Hence floating Libor payments with equal 
maturity and different rate tenors as in Figure 3 have not longer equivalent values as in 
eq. (1), cannot be replicated with each other, and the corresponding Basis Swaps display 
huge basis spreads, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above. We call this effect Libor 
tenor or replication symmetry breaking. 
Furthermore, also the market fixing mechanism makes an important difference. On 
one side, Libor is based, by definition, on banks’ perceptions of their own cost of funding 
in the OTC interbank market, not on actual transactions on an exchange market visible to 
other parties. Thus, in difficult times, when the money market may be very illiquid, Libor 
may be misrepresented, because just a few Libor contributors have actually traded in 
size at a given day, maturity and currency, and the others are forced to contribute a 
guess. Furthermore, Libor may be biased by those contributors not willing to show their 
funding troubles, as reported in [3] and argued e.g. in [4]. On the other hand, overnight 
rates, like Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average) or US Federal fund effective rate, are 
based on volume-weighted averages of actual transactions during the day, and thus they 
reflect the true (over night) cost of funding realised on the market. 
From the considerations above it is clear why overnight rates are nowadays the best 
available market proxy to risk-free rates. Thanks to their safe fixing mechanism and 
shortest possible tenor, they incorporate the smallest possible amount of counterparty 
default risk: precisely, the risk of default during the night (or the week end), given the 
market information available in the afternoon at close of business time. Hence eqs. (1) 
above must be modified, denoting with  the risk free Zero Coupon Bond for 
maturity Ti, and with  the FRA rate fixed at Tj-1 and payed at Tj, thus obtaining 
that all the floating Libor payment streams differ from each other, as in the following eq. 
(2). 
 
  (2) 
 
We refer to Appendix B for a brief summary of the quantities used above and to ref. 
[5] for a detailed explanation and a mathematical treatment of this problem. 
 
We conclude our analogy by observing that the credit crunch has forced a symmetry 
breaking in the money market: from a “classical” situation characterized by negligible 
credit and liquidity risk in which “all the Libors were equal”, showing replication 
invariance under Libor tenor transformations and negligible basis spreads, towards a new 
“modern” market hierarchy (or segmentation) characterized by non-negligible credit and 
liquidity risk in which “some Libors are more equal than others”, showing broken Libor 
tenor symmetry, no replication invariance and large basis spreads. We stress that such 
Libor spectroscopy was already present and well known to market players before the 
credit crunch, as discussed e.g. in ref. [6], but not effective due to negligible basis 
spreads. 
This is what we call the Zeeman effect in finance, as depicted in Figure 4 and 
summarized in Table 1, in which we show the one-to-one correspondences between 
physical and financial concepts. 
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Figure 4: qualitative picture of the Zeeman effects in physics and finance. Left panel: under the magnetic 
field, three Sodium sp atomic states and two D1 , D2 spectral lines (left side) split into three multiplets of 
2+2+4 states at different energies and two multiplets of 4+6 spectral lines (2 lines in gray in D1 are not 
observable due to quantum suppression) at different wavelengths, respectively (right side). Right panel: 
under credit and liquidity risk, Libor (left side) splits into its components with different tenors (right side), 
and the corresponding Basis Swap spread diverge from zero. In particular, the Overnight 1D-Libor multiplet 
(4 full vertical lines) and the three Libor-Libor multiplets (3+2+1 dashed vertical lines) correspond exactly to 
the Eonia-Euribor and Euribor-Euribor Basis Swaps in Figure 2. More details in Appendices A and B. 
 
 
 
  The Zeeman effect in Physics The Zeeman effect in finance 
Discovery Pieter Zeeman, Leyden, Aug. 1896. Global markets, Aug. 2007. 
Observation 
Atomic spectral lines in a magnetic 
field split into groups, called 
Zeeman multiplets (Zeeman, 1896). 
Basis Swaps with different tenors 
show, after the credit crunch, large 
gaps, called basis spreads. 
Technology 
Light spectroscopy, spectrometer. Libor spectroscopy, global markets, 
market data providers. 
In normal conditions (i.e. zero 
magnetic field): 
o distinct atomic states displaying 
symmetry properties (e.g. 
rotational invariance) have the 
same energy; 
o the corresponding spectral lines 
overlaps. 
In pre-credit crunch conditions (i.e. 
negligible credit/liquidity risk), 
o distinct Libor floating payments 
with equal maturity and 
different tenors have similar 
values (replication invariance); 
o the corresponding Basis Swaps 
display negligible basis spread. 
The external magnetic field breaks 
the atomic rotational symmetry and 
splits the atomic states at different 
energies. 
The credit and liquidity risk breaks 
the Libor tenor symmetry and splits 
equivalent Libor floating legs at 
different values. 
Interpretation 
The corresponding spectral lines 
split into observable multiplets. 
The corresponding Basis Swaps split 
into non-negligible basis spreads. 
The magnetic field may be set by 
the experimenter at a fixed and 
constant magnitude. 
The credit/liquidity risk is decided 
by the market and is intrinsically 
stochastic. 
Differences The zero magnetic field limit with 
perfect rotational symmetry and no 
Zeeman splitting is possible and 
observable. 
The zero credit/liquidity risk with 
perfect replication and zero basis 
spreads is an idealized case not 
observable in practice. 
Consequences 
Electron discovery, atomic 
structure, quantum mechanics. 
Risky interest rates, multiple yield 
curves, CSA-discounting, multiple-
curve pricing models. 
Table 1: similarities and differences between the Zeeman effects in physics and finance. 
 
 
3. Consequences 
The discovery of the Zeeman effect and its interpretation by Lorentz triggered deep 
and far consequences in physics 4 , contributing to the development of quantum 
mechanics and, ultimately, to the modern science. Analogously, after the credit crunch, 
the market segmentation into risky Libors with huge Basis Swap spreads has induced 
deep and far consequences in finance, contributing to the development of a modern 
market in which credit and liquidity are recognized sources of risk and play a crucial role. 
In what follows we briefly introduce and discuss these news. 
 
3.1. Market quotations 
A first main consequence has been the large diffusion of Collateral Agreements (CSA, 
or “Credit Support Annex” in the ISDA standard documentation) as the main instrument 
to reduce the counterparty risk. According to the ISDA Margin Survey 2011 [7], most of 
the interbank counterparties and OTC derivatives’ transactions are (bilateral, cash) 
collateralised. This fact has the important consequence that one is allowed to look at 
derivatives’ prices quoted on the interbank market as referring to transactions under CSA. 
It is worth to stress at this point a frequent misunderstanding: thinking to interest rate 
                                                 
4 By the way, Zeeman and Lorentz were also able to measure the ratio e/m between the electrical charge and 
the mass of the electron, one of the most important constants in physics, one year before the experimental 
discovery of the electron by J. J. Thomson in 1897. 
derivatives (Swaps for instance), the CSA reduces the component of credit and liquidity 
risk associated to the specific counterparties involved in the financial contract, but it does 
not affect the component of credit and liquidity risk intrinsically carried by the underlying 
Libor rate, which is linked to the average credit and liquidity risk of the interbank money 
market, or, more precisely, of the Libor panel banks. Thus we arrive at the counter-
intuitive, but correct, idea that Swaps under CSA are not counterparty risk free. The 
proof is essentially empiric: Basis Swap spreads quoted on the interbank market are both 
collateralised and far from zero at the same time. Not surprisingly, risks walk out of the 
door and return back from the window. 
 
3.2. Cost of funding and CSA-discounting  
The CSA diffusion in the OTC market has led to a second very important consequence, 
called CSA-discounting. Prior to the crisis, there was a general consensus on using Libor 
to discount future cash flows generated by OTC derivatives, because Libor represented 
the average funding rate in the interbank market and was considered a good proxy to a 
risk free rate, as required by the standard no-arbitrage mathematical framework for 
pricing derivatives. Nowadays Libor is ruled out as discounting rate because it is risky, 
and even tenor dependent. Which Libor should be used ? Libor 6M ? Libor 3M ? Libor 
overnight ?  
The answer is that, by no arbitrage, the discounting rate is the funding rate. Thus, in 
presence of CSA, the discounting and funding rate is precisely the collateral rate, which is 
normally overnight (e.g. Eonia, Sonia, Fed Funds, etc.), as implied by market OIS 
(Overnight Indexed Swaps). This is very welcome for no-arbitrage theory, because, as 
discussed above, overnight rates are presently the best proxy of risk free rates available 
on the market. Thus Libor has been abandoned as discounting rate in favour of the true 
funding rate set by the CSA.  
In case of transactions without CSA, no-arbitrage still requires a discounting rate that 
reflects the bank’s cost of funding on the market. The construction of such a funding 
curve is a difficult task because the bank has typically many sources of liquidity: the 
money and repo markets, the bond market, corporates’ credit lines, retail bank accounts 
and mortgages’ prepayment, etc. All these sources are characterized by their own 
interest rates, maturities and volumes that evolve over time in a non-deterministic 
(stochastic) way. Furthermore, the traditional money market funding may be just a 
minor fraction of the Bank’s total funding capability, in particular for large international 
retail banks.  
We stress that if each bank actualises future cash flows using its own market cost of 
funding, there is no more price agreement between counterparties. This is a question 
currently under theoretical investigation (see e.g. refs [8]-[12]). Further complications 
arise in case of non-standard CSA, e.g. one-way (asymmetrical) CSA, or in case the 
option to switch the collateral currency can be exercised (“CSA chaos”, see e.g. ref. [13]). 
 
3.3. Multiple curve world 
A third consequence of the credit crunch is the multiple curve world. Prior to the crisis a 
single yield curve was sufficient for computing both discount and forward rates for 
market-coherent pricing of interest rate derivatives. Nowadays the same operation 
requires a multiplicity of yield curves. First, discount rates must be computed from (at 
least) two different curves: the OIS curve or the funding curve, depending weather the 
deal is under CSA or not. Then, FRA rates with different tenors must be computed from 
the corresponding tenor-dependent yield curves, constructed coherently from market 
quotes of instruments with the same tenor, and with the chosen discounting curve. Thus 
the classical exercise of yield curve construction (even discarded in some financial 
training) is nowadays at the heart of modern pricing theory and practice (see e.g. refs. 
[14]-[20]).  
It is worth to stress that multiple curves construction implies the usage of multiple 
market data, often illiquid or even absent on the market. Furthermore, multiple curves 
implies also multiple delta sensitivities, or, in other words, multiple basis risk. Hence, 
hedging the risk of even plain vanilla interest rate derivatives (e.g. Swaps) become a 
very complex task in the post credit crunch world. 
The transition to the multiple curve world has triggered a revival of theoretical 
research about multiple-curve pricing models for interest rate derivatives. Prior to the 
crisis a single fundamental stochastic variable, e.g. a short rate, and a single dynamical 
process (Hull-White, for instance) was sufficient to model the term structure of interest 
rates. Nowadays, the market segmentation implies that multiple correlated dynamical 
processes are required to model the multiple interest rate term structures observed on 
the market. Clearly this is not an easy task, and the research is at the very beginning 
(see for example ref. [20]). In particular, the calibration of such models to the market is 
very difficult, because part of the model parameters are related to non-quoted 
instruments (options on the basis, for instance). A technique frequently used by market 
practitioners is to freeze the dynamical evolution of the basis term structure at its 
present value (basis freezing). Clearly this is equivalent to discard the contribution of the 
basis volatility and correlations to the price of derivatives, an approximation that should 
be kept under control. 
 
3.4. Switching to CSA-discounting in practice 
A fourth, very important point is how to switch financial institutions to CSA-
discounting in practice. This is not an easy task at all because of a variety of issues, 
discussed below. 
 
3.4.1. Market issues 
To date, some major clearing houses (e.g. LCH.Clearnet) have adopted the new 
methodology for interest rate Swaps. Some major broker (e.g. ICAP) has declared the 
adoption for interest rate derivatives (Swaps and options), and has changed the 
quotation pages consistently. The swaption market, in particular, has switched to forward 
premium quotation (as in the fx option market) precisely to reduce the impact of 
discounting. These changes can be occasionally checked on the market, in particular 
when in/out of the money interest rate derivatives are traded. Swaps, for instance, show 
a negligible sensitivity to the discount rate when their value is close to zero, as usual in 
standard trades at par, because the two legs have similar but opposite values and 
sensitivities. On the other side, the discount sensitivity may be important when the Swap 
is traded not at par (out of the money), e.g. in case of unwinding, because the netting 
between the two legs is only partial. Interest rate Cap/Floor/Swap options, instead, 
generally show smaller effects, because, once the market premium is fixed by supply and 
demand, the different discounting tends to be balanced by the different implicit volatility. 
The cancellation is perfect, by definition, for market options, and partial for off market 
options and legacy trades. Similar arguments apply to other market derivatives on 
different asset classes (inflation, fx, equity, credit), with the difference that the 
discounting effect may be further obscured by other sources of uncertainty, such as the 
inflation/fx curves/volatilities, the equity dividends and repo rates, the default probability 
curves, etc.  
In conclusion, disentangling the effect of CSA-discounting into market or counterparty 
prices is not an easy task, especially for non-interest rate derivatives and for non-CSA 
counterparties. 
 
3.4.2. Collateral and liquidity issues 
Evidence of CSA-discounting from collateral management may be controversial. 
Besides the intrinsic difficulties cited above, collateral margination is usually managed by 
collateral desks at portfolio level for each counterparty under CSA, and not at trade level, 
thus hiding the discounting effects even more. On the other hand, in case of disputation 
pricing details are shared between the two counterparties in order to match the mark to 
market of the collateralised trades, thus allowing much more market intelligence than 
usual. Another bias may be introduced by opportunistic counterparties posting or asking 
collateral using the most convenient discounting methodology. Further complications 
arise because of the typical variety of clauses and details of collateral agreements, such 
as haircuts, margination frequency, rate spreads, currency, one-way margination, etc. 
that require, in principle, more sophisticated and CSA-dependent pricing methodologies. 
The new ISDA standardised CSA [18] should address and simplify these issues. 
A very important challenge is the front-to-back integration of Banks’ internal credit 
and funding management, from trading to treasury, collateral and back office, in order to 
benefit of centralised credit and liquidity charges at single trade level. Such a re-
organisation of traditionally separated areas may result to be very difficult in large 
international banking groups characterised by an holding with multiple subsidiaries and 
locations. In particular, the yield curves used for pricing internal deals (trades between 
different legal entities inside the group) should reflect the true cost of internal funding 
within the group. 
 
3.4.3. Accounting issues 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) affirm that, “in determining the valuation of 
OTC derivative “a valuation technique (a) incorporates all factors that market participants 
would consider in setting a price and (b) is consistent with accepted economic 
methodologies for pricing financial instruments” (AG76). Thus there is a judgemental 
area where the estimation of fair value is based on market (multilateral) consensus. CSA-
discounting is a typical case of evolution of the market consensus regarding the meaning 
of CSA: from a simple accessory guarantee to a determinant of the fair value. 
Hedge accounting, in particular, is an accountancy practice allowed by IAS39 to 
mitigate the Profit & Loss volatility due to derivatives used for hedging. A typical situation 
arises when the interest rate risk of a liability (a bond issued by the bank for instance) is 
hedged using a Swap. Hedge accounting requires that the profit & loss of the package 
remains confined in the 80%-125% window with respect to the initial NPV. The pricing of 
the package is based on ad hoc methodologies (e.g. the liability cash flows are 
discounted using the floating rate of the Swap, for instance), that may partially account 
for the basis risk existing between the liability and the derivative. As a consequence the 
adoption of CSA-discounting may realize the basis risk, resulting in significant NPV jumps 
and even breaks of the hedge accounting 80-125 constrain. Hence, either the 
methodology must be revised to account for the basis risk, or hedges must be 
renegotiated. 
 
3.4.4. IT issues 
The adoption of CSA-discounting is a big issue from an IT point of view that requires 
huge resources to be properly addressed. Here are some critical points. 
o Booking of trades in pricing systems must be reviewed such that the information 
regarding the collateral is recovered.  
o Pricing systems configurations must be reviewed for CSA-compliance, allowing 
proper assignments to each trade of different yield curves depending on the CSA. 
o Multiple yield curves and volatilities bootstrapping must be properly implemented 
and configured in all pricing systems. 
o Price and risk computations must be reviewed in order to avoid hidden 
assumptions regarding discounting, e.g. automatic default yield curve usage 
without explicit assignment. 
o Commercial systems require new releases able to manage CSA-discounting. 
Vendors must be typically fed with appropriate specs and the new releases 
carefully tested. 
o Proprietary financial libraries must be reviewed and re-engineered to make them 
multiple-curve compliant. Previous poor library design is likely to require much 
more re-implementation effort.  
o Systems integration and alignment must be carefully checked to avoid the classical 
“two systems two prices” problem. 
In general, we can say that the switch to CSA-discounting is a kind of stress test for the 
IT architecture of a bank. The most confused IT situations typically imply much more 
effort to switch, and vice versa. 
 3.4.5. Risk Management issues 
The main risk management issues involved into CSA-discounting are below. 
o Market risk: the most important source of market risk involved in CSA-
discounting is the basis risk in the multiple-curve world, in which even plain vanilla 
interest rate derivatives (e.g. Swaps) display complex delta exposures distributed 
across multiple Libors with different tenors and OIS rates. This kind of risk may be 
not fully captured or represented in standard, old style pricing frameworks 
grounded on Libor discounting. Basis risk is also expensive to hedge, requiring 
market Swaps, OIS and Basis Swaps. In practice, it is often partially hedged in the 
classical fashion, using standard Libor Swaps, thus leaving an open exposure to 
the Libor-OIS basis. The latter may be huge (Fig. 4) and volatile (Fig.3). The 
corresponding (un)expected profit & loss is typically realized in case of unwindings 
or in case of adoption of CSA-discounting, for instance when trades are migrated 
to Central Counterparties. 
o Model risk: this source of risk regards the usage of interest rate models (e.g. 
Hull-White, Libor Market Model, HJM, etc.) for pricing and hedging derivatives in a 
multiple-curve world. On the one hand, classical single-curve models imply strong 
approximations and do not capture the basis risk, that will be revealed once the 
models are updated in the form of an unexpected NPV jump. On the other hand, 
modern multiple-curve models may be able to give a better description of the basis 
risk but, to date, they are more complex, still under development, and there is no 
standard on the market. 
o Counterparty risk: this source of risk is captured in CSA-discounting in the sense 
that, for trades under CSA, the collateral reduces the counterparty risk and the 
OIS-discounting ensures no-arbitrage between the collateral rate and the 
discounting rate. A residual source of counterparty risk is left behind by re-
hypothecation issues and by the mechanics of margination [19]. In case of 
absence of CSA, Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) and Debt Value Adjustment (DVA) 
must be calculated. We stress that a consistent treatment of DVA and funding is an 
open topic still under investigation (see e.g. [9]-[11]). 
o Funding liquidity risk: with funding liquidity risk we mean the risk of changing 
market funding rate. Funding liquidity risk management under CSA-discounting is 
complicated by the fact that derivatives have a funding impact that depends on the 
CSA. Hence a centralised liquidity management, integrating treasury, collateral 
management and sales/trading desks, would allow both a full view of all the 
expected cash flows generated by the bank’s activity by derivatives in particular, 
and a correct pricing of funding costs at single trade level. 
o Operational risk: the main source of operational risk (the risk of loss resulting 
from failed internal processes, people, systems, or external events) generated by 
CSA-discounting is related to the increasing complication of pricing systems and 
liquidity management discussed above. A typical example may be a wrong 
assignment between a deal or a group of deals and their CSA, resulting in a wrong 
pricing. An unexpected Profit & Loss is revealed when the mistake is fixed. 
We conclude with the observation that the main driver of the switch to CSA-
discounting is the evolution of pricing and risk methodologies, under the pressure of 
market evolution after the credit crunch. This a typical situation in which a solid Risk 
Management with strong quantitative resources may serve as the pivot of the innovation. 
 
3.4.6. Management issues 
Management is called to lead the change, and the corresponding frictions, taking 
business opportunities and controlling risks and costs. The main management decisions 
required for switching to CSA-discounting, as discussed in the points above, regard: 
o timing: when to switch 
o how to switch: all together or piecewise, depending on currency, asset classes, 
desks, subsidiaries, time-zone, main trading markets, etc. 
o a clear view about the multiple funding sources of the Bank (the funding curve) 
and re-organisation for centralised credit and liquidity management 
o review and cleaning of collateral agreements with counterparties  
o how to manage the basis risk and the Profit & Loss generated by the switch 
o how to manage the hedge accounting 
o IT upgrade: booking, pricing, reporting, etc. 
o communication and explanation of the switch to markets, customers, auditors and 
regulators. 
 
3.4.7. The role of Quants 
It is clear from the discussion above that CSA-discounting is a typical complex 
problem in which a simple no-arbitrage pricing issue (choosing the correct discounting 
curve) generates many consequences that propagate all around in the market and inside 
the banks. In such a situation quant people have the responsibility of extending the 
modern no-arbitrage pricing framework into other areas of the bank, traditionally not 
familiar with pricing issues, in order to reach a better fair value and risk management at 
Bank’s level. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Once upon a time…  
there was a classical financial world in which all the Libors were equal. Nowadays credit, 
liquidity and basis risk plays a crucial role. The Interbank market has developed an high 
degree of collateralisation, such that we may look at derivatives’ quotations as referring 
to transactions under CSA. The cost of funding OTC derivatives has become a central 
topic in derivatives pricing. Multiple yield curves must be bootstrapped from multiple 
market data, and even plain vanilla interest rate Swaps display complex risk exposures 
distributed across multiple Libors and funding rates with different tenors. Multiple-curve 
interest rate models must be developed for pricing both plain vanilla and exotic 
derivatives. Switching to CSA discounting is not only a pricing issue of changing discount 
factors, but implies multiple issues investing all areas of the Bank, and a change of 
paradigm towards a more integrated management of Bank’s funding across trading, 
treasury and collateral.  
... and they all lived happily ever after …?  
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Quantum mechanics and Zeeman effect in a nutshell 
In this Appendix we report a short description of the concepts and quantities cited in 
section 1 above. For more details see e.g. ref. [2]. 
The physics of atoms and molecules is described by one of the best scientific theories 
ever conceived by mankind: quantum mechanics. It is based on the experimentally 
observed dual particle-wave nature of matter and energy, and it is formalised into a set 
of postulates, known as the Copenhagen interpretation, prescribing the mathematical 
rules to describe a quantum system and to compute its physical properties. In a nutshell, 
any physical system  is associated with an appropriate Hilbert space . Any physical 
state of  is described by an appropriate element , where x is a generic vector 
containing all the fundamental variables (e.g. positions of the system’s particles in the 3D 
space), called wavefunction or state vector, that contains all the possible informations on 
. The dynamics of the state is governed by the Schrödinger equation  
 
  (3) 
 
where  is the Hamiltonian operator representing the total (kinetic + potential) energy of 
the system,  Joule x second is the reduced Planck’s constant, 
and i is the imaginary unit. The time-independent version of the Schrödinger equation, 
suitable for stationary systems (like atoms), is 
 
  (4) 
 
where E is the energy (eigenvalue of ) of the state  (eigenvector of ).  
Any physically observable quantity Q (e.g. energy, position, momentum, magnetic 
field, etc.) is considered as a stochastic variable associated with a probability measure 
and with an operator  in  , whose eigenvalues and eigenvectors  
 
  (5) 
 
constitute, under appropriate mathematical conditions, the spectrum of any possible 
value for Q and an orthonormal basis in , respectively. The probability that an 
observation of Q at time t provides the value  is given by the Born rule 
 
  (6) 
 
while the expected value and the variance of Q at time t are given by  
 
  (7) 
 
Given any two physically observables quantities , the Jordan’s theorem 
 
  (8) 
 
holds, where  is called commutator. If  then  cannot be measured 
together with any precision and are called incompatible observables. For example, 
position x and momentum p of a one dimensional single free particle are incompatible 
because 
 
  (9) 
 
This is the famous Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. On the other side if  
commute, , they are said to be compatible observables, and can be physically 
measured together with any precision. In particular, any observable  such that 
 is said a constant of motion because 
 
  (10) 
 
Moreover,  commute if and only if they have a common orthonormal basis of 
eigenvectors 
 
  (11) 
 
There are further postulates that incorporate into the theory all the experimental 
observations, e.g. the Pauli exclusion principle, the correspondence principle with 
classical mechanics, etc. Thus all that one must do to compute the physical properties of 
quantum system is to: 
o characterise the Hilbert space  and the physical operators  associated with the 
system ; 
o model the Hamiltonian , describing the energy of the system ; 
o choose the appropriate constants of motion and find the complete orthonormal 
basis in common with ; 
o find the solution  of the time-dependent Schrödinger equation (3) as linear 
combination of the eigenvectors of ; 
o compute the physically observable properties Q of  using eq. (6). 
 
We may now apply the formalism above to the case of the Zeeman effect. The 
Hamiltonian for an atom in a magnetic field is given by 
 
  (12) 
 
where  is the unperturbed Hamiltonian of the atom without magnetic field,  is the 
perturbation of the magnetic field ,  is the magnetic moment operator of the atom, 
 are the orbital, spin and total electronic angular momentum operators, 
respectively,  is the Bohr’s magneton (representing the minimum dipole magnetic 
moment of an atomic electron), and  are the L, S gyromagnetic ratios, respectively. 
Taking a magnetic field constant over the atomic dimension and choosing our z axis 
parallel to  we have 
 
  (13) 
 
Denoting the unperturbed spectrum common to  with  
 
  (14) 
 
where n, l, j, mj are the quantum numbers associated with the four physical operators in 
eq. (14), one obtains, using perturbation theory, the total spectrum common to 
 as  
 
  (15) 
 
where  is called Landé g-factor. This is the final theoretical formula for the energy of 
electronic states in a magnetic field. We see that for non-null magnetic field B0 the mj 
degeneracy – due to the conservation of angular momentum J and Jz by eq. (13) - is 
broken, and there is an energy splitting, equal to the term , of the original atomic 
states with energy  depending linearly on B0 and on the quantum numbers 
associated with the states. In particular, any electronic state with given n, l, j numbers is 
split into 2j+1 states corresponding to mj values. 
The result above apply to any atomic system. In particular, we may explain the 
Zeeman effect in Sodium (Figure ). The atomic structure of Sodium, similarly to the other 
alkaline metals, is characterised by a core of tightly bounded atomic electrons plus one 
single electron occupying the outermost, less bounded, electronic state. The two D1 and 
D2 spectral lines of Sodium correspond to transitions of this single electron between the 
ground state and the first two excited states, 
 
  (16) 
 
where we have used the standard spectroscopic notation for atomic states 
 
  (17) 
 
The magnetic field breaks the  states into two states each, corresponding to 
, and the  state into four states, corresponding to . Hence the two 
D1 , D2 spectral lines split into two multiplets of lines, differing from the mother lines of 
wavelengths given by  
 
  (18) 
 
There are in principle 4 + 8 spectral lines, but only 4 + 6 lines are observable, as shown 
in Figure 4, according with the electromagnetic selection rules 
 
  (19) 
 
that suppress the two lines  with , in 
perfect agreement with the experimental evidence in Figure . 
 
 
Appendix B: No-arbitrage pricing and interest rate derivatives in a nutshell 
In this Appendix we report a short description of the concepts and quantities cited in 
sections 2-3 above. For more details see e.g. refs. [5], [16]-[22]. 
 
Nowadays the most important fundamental variables for interest rate derivatives are 
the basic interest rates underlying these contracts, Libor, Euribor and Eonia in particular. 
Libor (London Interbank Offered Rate), sponsored by the British Bankers Association 
(BBA) and first published in 1986, is the reference rate for money market and over-the-
counter (OTC) swap transactions. Libor is exchanged on the London money market 
through unsecured loans called Certificates of Deposit (see below) for 15 different 
maturities (or Libor tenors, from 1 day to 12 months), and for all the major world’s 
currencies. Every business day it is fixed as the trimmed average (excluding the highest 
and the lowest 25%) of the contributions of a panel of primary dealers, answering to the 
question "At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then 
accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 a.m. London 
time?". The Contribution Panels are composed by 8-12-16 banks per currency, selected 
according to scale of market activity and reputation, reviewed twice a year. Thus Libor 
reflects the average perceived cost of funding of banks in the London interbank money 
market for each given tenor and currency. 
Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate), sponsored by the European Banking 
Federation (EBF) and first published on 30 December 1998, is the reference rate for Euro 
money market and OTC swap transactions. It is defined as “the rate at which Euro 
interbank Deposits are being offered within the EMU zone by one prime bank to another 
at 11:00 a.m. Brussels time". The rate fixing mechanics is similar to Libor, except for the 
averaging (the highest and lowest 15% are excluded) and for the panel, that gathers 
more than 40 banks selected according to their business volume and reputation in the 
Euro zone money markets, plus some large international bank from non-EU countries 
with important euro zone operations. Thus Euribor reflects the average perceived cost of 
funding of banks in the Euro interbank money market for each given tenor. 
Eonia (Euro OverNight Index Average rate), sponsored by the EBF and first published 
on 4 January 1999, is the reference rate for Euro OTC overnight Deposits. Eonia is fixed 
every business day as the average rate (without exclusions) of the overnight transactions 
(one day tenor) executed during that day by the banks in the Euribor panel. Eonia is 
used by the European Central Bank (ECB) as a tool of effecting and observing the 
transmission of its monetary policy actions. Thus Eonia rate reflects the actual overnight 
cost of liquidity expectations of banks and the monetary policy effects in the Euro money 
market. Similar discussions apply to overnight rates in other currencies, such as Fed 
Fund rate (USD), Sonia (Sterling OverNight Index Average), etc. 
 
The no-arbitrage pricing framework of financial derivatives is based on the 
fundamental pricing theorem: given a generic financial instrument Π and a reference 
asset N, called numeraire, with payoffs  at time T, respectively, under 
appropriate conditions there exist a unique martingale probability measure QN associated 
to N, such that 
 
  (20) 
 
where  are the prices of Π and N at time t<T and  denotes the 
expectation of a stochastic variable X at time T conditioned to the information set 
available at time t under the probability measure QN. Two measures are particularly 
useful for pricing derivatives, because they are associated to the two simplest 
numeraires: the risk free Bank Account and the Zero Coupon Bond. The Bank Account 
is an ideal financial instrument representing an abstract loan that rewards its holder with 
the risk free rate, such that 
 
  (21) 
 
where rd(t) is a risk free spot instantaneous short rate over the time interval , 
 is the risk free stochastic discount factor and  is the risk neutral measure 
associated to Bd. Thus the price  at time t of any derivative is the expectation of the 
discounted payoff  at time T>t under the risk neutral measure (last eq. above). The 
risk free Zero Coupon Bond is a contract in which one party guarantees to the other 
party the payment of one unit of currency at maturity date T, with no other payments, 
such that  
 
  (22) 
 
where  is the T-forward measure associated to Pd(t;T). Thus the price at time t of the 
risk free zero coupon bond is the expectation of the stochastic discount factor at time T>t 
under the risk neutral measure (second line above), and the derivative’s price  can be 
written as the expectation of the payoff discounted with Pd(t;T). 
For interest rates, in particular, the FRA rate  associated to the Libor with tenor 
x plays a central role. It is defined as the expectation at time t of the Libor fixing with 
tenor x at time  
 
  (23) 
 
under the Ti-forward probability measure  associated to the Zero Coupon Bond , 
has the following interesting properties: 
 
1. At fixing date Ti-1 it coincides with the Libor rate  
 
  (24) 
 
2. At any time t < Ti-1 it is a martingale under the probability measure  such that 
 
  (25) 
 
 following the stochastic differential equation 
 
  (26) 
 
where W(t) is a standard Brownian motion with zero mean and unit variance and 
 is the FRA rate (lognormal) instantaneous volatility, such that  
 
  (27) 
 
3. In the limit of negligible counterparty/liquidity risk (no Libor segmentation) it 
recovers the classical single-curve value 
 
  (28) 
 
We will use the results above to derive the pricing formulas for the simplest interest rate 
derivatives. 
Interest rate Certificates of Deposit, or simply Deposits (Figure 5), are standard 
zero coupon unsecured loans, exchanged on the money market between banks and 
major financial institutions, such that, at start date T0, counterparty A (the Lender) pays 
a nominal amount N to counterparty B (the Borrower) and at maturity date Ti (i=1,…,N) 
the Borrower, if not defaulted, pays back to the Lender the nominal amount N plus the 
interest accrued over the time interval  (called Deposit or rate tenor x) at the 
annual simply compounded Libor rate  (or Euribor, Eonia, or any other rate), 
fixed just prior T0 (two working days in the EUR market). 
 
  
Figure 5: schematic picture of a Deposit contract.
Depo(t ,T i ) Depo(T i ,T i )
t iT
Lx(T 0 ,T i  )
0T
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus the payoff and the price of the Deposit at times Ti and t such that T0 < t < Ti (when 
the Libor is already known), respectively, are given by  
 
  (29) 
  
where  is the year fraction over , with the appropriate day count convention, 
and we have assumed the existence of a risk free Zero Coupon Bond with payoff 
 at maturity Ti and price  at time t < Ti acting as discount factor. 
Interest rate Swaps (Figure 6) are OTC contracts in which two counterparties agree to 
exchange two streams of cash flows, typically tied to a fixed rate K against floating rate 
Lx with tenor x. These payment streams are called fixed and floating leg of the Swap, 
respectively, and they are characterized by two schedules S, T and coupon payoffs 
 
  (30) 
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Figure 6: schematic picture of a fixed vs floating Swap.  
Vertical full/dashed lines denote fixed/floating cash flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where  and  are the year fractions with the fixed and floating rate conventions, 
respectively. The price of the Swap, using eq. (23), is given by 
 
  (31) 
 
where  are the swap side (receiver/payer of the fixed 
rate), the swap rate, the annuity, and the FRA rate, respectively, of the Swap.  
Forward Rate Agreements (FRA) are elementary Swaps with a single cash flow on 
both legs. 
Interest rate Basis Swaps (Figure 7) are floating vs floating Swaps tied to two Libors 
with different tenors. The Basis Swap schedule and price in terms of basis swap spread 
are given, using eq. (31), by 
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 Figure 7: schematic picture of a Basis Swap contract, with tenor y=2x, e.g. Libor 6M vs Libor 3M. 
 
The basis spread is defined as the difference between the swap rates of two fixed vs 
floating Swaps with equal fixed legs (annual payment frequency) and with floating legs 
indexed to the two Libors with different tenors (and corresponding payment frequencies). 
FRA and Swap contracts for different currencies, tenors and maturities are quoted in real 
time on the financial market. Using the formulas above, written in terms of the FRA rates 
, the corresponding FRA rate term structures can be extracted from such quotations 
and used, by interpolation, to price similar FRAs/Swaps not directly quoted on the market. 
 
In the limit of negligible counterparty/liquidity risk, eq. (28), we return to a single-
curve framework (the indexes d, x drops) and we obtain the classical Swap pricing 
expression cited in pre-crisis textbooks on interest rate modelling (e.g. [21], [22]): 
 
  (33) 
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